Minimum wages and schooling: evidence from the UK's introduction of a national minimum wage by Rice, Patricia
SERC DISCUSSION PAPER 50
Minimum Wages and Schooling:
Evidence from the UK’s Introduction
of a National Minimum Wage
Patricia Rice (SERC, Department of Economics, University of Oxford)
May 2010
This work was part of the research programme of the independent UK Spatial 
Economics Research Centre funded by the Economic and Social Research Council 
(ESRC), Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR), the 
Department for Communities and Local Government (CLG), and the Welsh Assembly 
Government. The support of the funders is acknowledged. The views expressed are 
those of the authors and do not represent the views of the funders. 
 
© P. Rice, submitted 2010 
Minimum Wages and Schooling: 
Evidence from the UK’s Introduction of a 
National Minimum Wage 
Patricia Rice* 
 
May 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* SERC, Department of Economics, University of Oxford 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
My thanks to seminar participants at Oxford, SERC-LSE and University College Dublin, and 
in particular Steve Bond, Martin Browning, Paul Devereux and Steve Gibbons, for their 
helpful comments and suggestions. My thanks goes also to the Department of Children, 
Families and School for providing access to the geographic identifiers in the YCS and to the 
UK Data Archive for supplying the data.  
Abstract 
This paper uses the introduction of the national minimum wage in the UK in April 1999 as a 
‘natural experiment’ to analyse the impact of minimum wages on enrolment in schooling. At 
the time of its introduction, only workers aged 18 years or more were covered by the 
legislation. The paper uses panel data for a sample of young people in a given school-year 
cohort, some of whom were aged 18 years in spring 1999 and therefore eligible to receive the 
national minimum wage, and others who were aged only 17 years. We compare participation 
in post-compulsory schooling for the two groups, both before and after the enactment of the 
legislation and find robust evidence that eligibility for the national minimum wage 
significantly reduces the probability of participation in post-compulsory schooling for young 
people living in areas where the national minimum is high relative to local earnings. 
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1. Introduction 
Few issues in economics are as contentious as the effects of statutory minimum wages on 
labour market outcomes. While much of the debate focuses on employment, the potential 
impact on enrolment in schooling is also a matter of some dispute. On the one hand, by 
raising wages for the unskilled and reducing the wage differentials between skilled and 
unskilled labour, wage floors reduce the incentives to invest in further education or training. 
It has been suggested that “reduced training opportunities or lowered educational attainment 
could be much more widespread than disemployment effects, and could – by lowering skill 
acquisition at young ages – have longer lasting consequences for the affected individuals” 
(Neumark and Wascher, 2003). Others argue that by increasing the relative demand for 
higher skilled workers, minimum wages may actually increase the incentives to invest in 
education and training in order to compete effectively for more skilled jobs (Cahuc and 
Michel, 1996).  In contrast to the very large empirical literature examining the employment 
effects of minimum wages, empirical studies of the effects on school enrolment are relatively 
few in number and almost all relate to North America.  In this paper, we use the introduction 
of a national minimum wage in the UK in Spring 1999 as a ‘natural experiment’ to 
investigate the effect of minimum wages on enrolment in post-compulsory schooling among 
a cohort of young people aged 17/18 years. 
In April 1999, following the recommendations of the independent Low Pay 
Commission, the UK government introduced a national minimum wage. This followed a 
period of many years in which there was no statutory minimum wage for most sectors of the 
UK economy1.  The new legislation specified a minimum hourly rate for all employees aged 
22 years or more, and a lower ‘youth development’ rate for those aged 18 to 21 years.  
                                                 
1
 The exception was the agricultural sector where the Agricultural Wages Board (AWB) had a statutory 
obligation to fix minimum wages for employees in England and Wales. The Board also had discretionary 
powers to decide other terms and conditions of employment, e.g. holidays and sick pay. 
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Individuals below the aged of 18 years were exempt from the legislation until 2003, when a 
third “youth” rate was introduced for those aged 16 and 17 years.  This paper makes use of 
the fact that assignment to the treatment – eligibility to receive the national minimum wage – 
is determined by being on either side of a fixed age threshold of 18 years.  Our empirical 
analysis relates to a sample of young people drawn from a given school-year cohort, some of 
whom were aged 18 years in April 1999 and hence belong to the treatment group, and others 
who were below the age of 18 years and form the control group.  Thus, we avoid the 
necessity of making assumptions about the comparability of a treatment and control group 
whose members are drawn from different parts of the wage distribution or from different 
geographical areas as in previous studies (e.g. Stewart, 2004).   
Uncovering the causal effect of eligibility for the minimum wage is complicated by 
the possibility that other unobservable factors associated with the individual’s relative age 
may affect a young person’s participation in post-compulsory schooling. Those who are 
relatively old in their school year appear to have significant educational and social 
advantages over their younger counterparts and such advantages have been shown to persist 
into adulthood, through differences in human capital accumulation and in the development of 
softer skills such as maturity and leadership (Bedard and Dhuey, 2006; Cunha et al, 2006).  
For our sample, we have detailed information on their participation in education and other 
activities during the spring of 1998, before the introduction of the national minimum wage, 
and again during early summer 1999, once the legislation was in place. The availability of 
panel data allows us to control for any unobserved heterogeneity that may be associated with 
the relative age of an individual and hence correlated with their eligibility for the minimum 
wage.  
In what follows, we use a conditional logit framework to estimate the treatment effect 
of eligibility for the national minimum wage on enrolment in post-compulsory schooling. 
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With the effect of eligibility for the minimum wage restricted to be homogenous across 
members of the school-year cohort, we find no evidence of a statistically significant impact 
on the probability that a young person is enrolled in full-time post-compulsory schooling.  
However, the ‘bite’ of the national minimum - the extent to which it affected the distribution 
of earnings in the local labour market - varies considerably across Great Britain as shown in 
Stewart (2002).  It would be surprising if the national minimum wage had the same impact on 
young people’s behaviour in the relatively well-paid areas of south-east England as in the less 
prosperous local labour markets of the north-east.  If the treatment effect is allowed to vary 
with the ‘bite’ of the national minimum wage then eligibility to receive the national minimum 
wage is found to significantly reduce the probability of enrolment in post-compulsory 
schooling for young people living in relatively low paid areas.  Taking the ratio of the 
national minimum wage to the 20th percentile of the pre-legislation distribution of hourly 
earnings as the measure of ‘bite’, our results suggest that the national minimum wage reduced 
enrolment in schooling in those local areas where the ‘bite‘ exceeded some 64 percent.  This 
was the case in around 60 percent of local areas in England and Wales, covering nearly 70 
percent of the school-year cohort. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing empirical evidence 
on the effects of minimum wages on school enrolment. Section 3 explains the model set-up 
and estimation strategy, and the data are described in some detail in section 4. A premise of 
the estimation strategy is that the introduction of the national minimum wage in 1999 
significantly increased the wages of those workers covered by the legislation relative to those 
of their younger counterparts and we examine the evidence for this in section 5. Section 6 
presents our main results on the effects of minimum wages on school enrolment, and the 
robustness of these findings is assessed in section 7. 
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2.  Related Literature  
The theoretical implications of minimum wages for enrolment in schooling are far from clear 
cut.  In a simple static setting, introducing a minimum wage, like any price change, has 
income and substitution effects on an individual’s choices.   The introduction of a wage floor, 
assuming that it is effective, raises wage rates for some young unskilled workers and in so 
doing increases their opportunity costs of schooling.  At the same time, by increasing their 
expected income, the minimum wage may induce some individuals to reduce their hours of 
work and consume more schooling. So for example a young person may choose to switch 
from full-time working to part-time working combined with enrolment in schooling. This 
simple static analysis becomes more complicated when we allow for the possibility that by 
reducing the relative demand for unskilled labour, a minimum wage may reduce the 
probability of employment for young school leavers, offsetting the effects of higher wages on 
expected income.  
From the perspective of an investment decision, if the introduction of a minimum 
wage reduces wage differentials between skilled and unskilled workers then the expected 
returns to human capital investment are reduced.  Others have argued that by increasing the 
relative demand for more skilled labour, minimum wages increase the incentives to invest in 
education in order to compete for higher skilled jobs (Cahuc and Michel, 1996), or to 
increase the probability of gaining minimum wage employment (Agell and Lommerud, 
1997). 
The empirical evidence on this question is mixed. Early influential studies by 
Neumark and Wascher (1995a,b,c) using US data report that increases in minimum wages 
lead to lower rates of school enrolment among 16 to 19 year olds, coupled with higher rates 
of inactivity (i.e. not in school and not employed), particularly among individuals in the 
youngest age category ( 16 and 17 year olds) and ethnic minorities.  They conclude that 
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higher minimum wages result in individuals leaving full-time education in order to ‘queue’ 
for better-paid jobs. Employers tend to substitute in favour of these higher quality young 
workers, resulting in higher rates of unemployment among their lower quality counterparts. A 
more recent study by the same authors updating the data to 1998 confirms these earlier 
findings (Neumark and Waschter, 2003).  Turner and Demiralp (2001) also report evidence 
that Black and Hispanic teenagers and teenagers based in inner-cities areas are more likely to 
become inactive as a result of a minimum wage increase. 
Card (1992) focuses on the effect of the 27% increase in the California state minimum 
wage in 1988 and finds evidence of decreases in school enrolment in California relative to 
other comparable states that did not experience an increase in the minimum.  More recently, 
Chaplin, Turner and Paper (2003) analyse US Department of Education data covering the 
entire population of public school students in the US.  They find evidence of lower state-level 
continuation ratios, particularly between grade 9 and grade 10 (corresponding roughly to ages 
16 to 17 years), for states with higher minimum wages.  
In addition to the US evidence, there have been a series of studies based on Canadian 
data, exploiting the fact that minimum wage rates vary by province as well as by time. Here, 
the evidence on the effects on school enrolment rates is more mixed. Landon (1997) found 
evidence that higher minimum wages are associated with lower school enrolment rates 
among 16 and 17 year olds.  By contrast, Baker (2003) found no evidence of an effect on the 
enrolment of those subject to compulsory schooling laws (ages 15 to 16 years) and a modest 
positive effect on older age groups (17 to 19 years and 20 to 24 years).  Campolieti, Fang and 
Gunderson (2003) report no significant effects on school enrolment rates or rates of 
employment.   
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Little empirical evidence exists for countries outside of North America. In 2001, New 
Zealand reformed its minimum wage legislation, reducing the age of eligibility for the adult 
minimum to 18 years and at the same time increasing the youth minimum wage rate from 60 
percent to 80 percent of the adult rate.  Hyslop and Stillman (2007) examine the effects of 
these reforms on labour market outcomes for 16 to17 year olds and 18 to 19 year olds.   They 
find evidence that these reforms had negative effects on participation in full-time education 
for both age categories. In addition, there was some evidence that the reforms led to higher 
rates of unemployment and inactivity among the younger age group, but this finding was less 
robust. 
 Previous studies of the impact of the introduction of a national minimum wage in the 
UK have focused on its effects on employment, hours of work and the distribution of 
earnings.  There is a large body of empirical work, much of it reviewed in Metcalf (2008).  
Drawing together the results of these studies, Metcalf concludes that the national minimum 
wage contributed to higher levels of real and relative earnings for low paid workers, and to a 
significant decline in inequality in the lower half of the earnings distribution. There is little 
evidence of significant adverse effects on employment, although there is some evidence of a 
reduction in hours of work among those whose pay was raised as a result of the legislation 
(Stewart and Swaffield, 2008).  None of the studies undertaken to date have considered the 
question addressed in the present paper; namely what has been the impact of the national 
minimum wage of on enrolment in schooling? 
3. Model set-up and estimation strategy 
The UK Labour Party came into government in May 1997 with a manifesto commitment to 
introduce a national minimum wage. The details of the legislation were not yet decided and 
an independent Low Pay Commission was tasked with producing recommendations on the 
coverage and the level of the proposed wage floor.  The Low Pay Commission produced its 
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report in the summer of 1998, and shortly after, the details of the legislation were published.  
With effect from April 1st 1999, a national minimum wage (NMW) of £3.60 per hour would 
apply for all those aged 22 years or more, with a lower ‘development’ rate of £3.00 per hour 
for those aged 18 to 21 years. Those below the age of 18 years were exempt from the 
legislation. 
Against this background, the school-year cohort of young people used in our 
empirical analysis completed their compulsory schooling, and proceeded to further education,  
work-based training, employment or in some cases, inactivity/unemployment. Our data 
relates to a sample of young people who completed their compulsory schooling during the 
summer of 1997, shortly after the new Labour government took power.  The first sweep of 
data on this group was collected in the spring of 1998, prior to the publication of the Low Pay 
Commission’s recommendations.  The second sweep of data was collected in the early 
summer of 1999, after the introduction of the national minimum wage. At the time of the 
second sweep, some members of cohort were aged 18 years and hence eligible to receive the 
lower ‘development’ rate of £3 per hour; others were still only 17 years of age and hence not 
covered by the legislation.  
The question we wish to address in this paper is what would have been the rate of 
enrolment in full-time education of those young people eligible to receive the national 
minimum if the legislation had not been introduced, and do their observed participation rates 
differ significantly from these. The approach adopted is to compare changes in the enrolment 
in full-time education between spring 1998 and early summer 1999 for the ‘treatment’ group 
of those aged 18 years at the time of the second sweep, with the experience of the ‘control’ 
group of those aged only 17 years.   
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To be more precise, let 
ij
S denote the school enrolment status of individual i at sweep j  
(
ij
S =1 if i is enrolled in full-time education at sweep j, 
ij
S =0 otherwise, for j=1 or 2).  
Suppose that in the absence of the minimum wage legislation, the probability of enrolment in 
post-compulsory schooling evolves over time according to some function of the individual’s 
age, which itself is determined by the individual’s date of birth and the survey date. Further 
assume that the introduction of the national minimum wage has a constant effect,θ , on the 
enrolment rate for those treated and no effect on enrolment rates for members of the control 
group.   Under these assumptions, the enrolment status of individual i in sweep j may be 
modelled as  
otherwise.   
..if         
0
01
=
>+++=
ij
ijijjiij
S
NMWTS εθδα
                                                     (1) 
Where 
i
α is an unobserved time-invariant individual-specific effect which subsumes any 
date-of-birth effects;  
j
T  is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for j=2 and is 
equal to zero otherwise. 
ij
NMW  is the treatment indicator; so 1=
ij
NMW  if individual i is 
aged 18 years and j=2, and is equal to zero otherwise. 
ij
ε is an unobservable error term.  The 
simple specification in (1) may be extended by adding a vector of additional control 
variables,
ij
x , that are thought to affect the probability that an individual is enrolled in school 
at a given age.  
There are a number of alternative approaches to estimating a model (1).  One is to 
parameterize the distribution of the 
i
α  conditional on 
j
T and 
ij
NMW making the model fully 
parametric. The main drawback of this so-called random effects approach is that if the 
distributional assumptions do not hold then in general all the parameter estimates are 
inconsistent.  The alternative is to treat the 
i
α as parameters and thereby avoid making any 
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assumptions regarding their distribution. With a large number of individuals and a small fixed 
number of time periods, as in the present case, the number of parameters increases with 
sample size giving rise to the ‘incidental parameters’ problem which leads also to 
inconsistent parameter estimates.  This problem can be avoided by identifying a feature of the 
model that depends on the parameter(s) of interest, in this case the treatment effect, θ , but 
not on the 
i
α . An example of this approach is the conditional logit model (Chamberlain, 
1984).  If we assume that the error 
ij
ε is logistically distributed independent of 
ijji
NMWT ,,α  
then conditioning on 121 =+ ii SS  
).exp(
],,,,,|Pr[
2
2211211 1
111
i
iiiiiiii
NMW
NMWDNMWDSSS
θδα ++==+=                (2)                        
In other words, for those individuals whose enrolment status changes between sweep 1 and 
sweep 2 of the survey, the probability that it changes from 1 to 0, as opposed to changing 
from 0 to 1, is described by a logit model with explanatory variables equal to the first 
difference of the variables in (1) and does not depend on the 
i
α .  The treatment effect θ  can 
be estimated from (2) without making any assumptions on the individual-specific effects, 
i
α .   
As noted by Honore (2002), it is intuitively appealing that the individuals who do not 
switch enrolment status are not used to estimate the treatment effect, θ , since their behaviour 
can be rationalized by an extremely large or an extremely small values of 
i
α  for any value of 
θ .  However, there are costs to this approach. Most notably, by estimating θ  in (2) we can 
assess whether or not the treatment – in this case eligibility for the national minimum wage - 
has a significant impact on individual behaviour. We also can estimate the effect of the 
treatment on the probability that the individual is enrolled in full-time schooling conditional 
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on a particular value for 
i
α , but it is not possible to calculate the average effect of the 
treatment across the distribution of 
i
α  in the population. 
The key identifying assumption of this model is that eligibility for the national 
minimum wage is the only source of discontinuity in behaviour at age 18 years. Clearly this 
is questionable. It is possible that due to custom and practise, young workers move from 
juvenile to adult pay scales on attaining the age of 18 years, and this produces a discontinuity 
in behaviour. A second identifying assumption is that the introduction of the national 
minimum wage has no impact on the younger age group who are not directly covered by the 
legislation. However, there may be wage spillovers. Firms may choose to pay the minimum 
wage to all their younger workers, irrespective of whether they are 18 years of age or 
younger.   Alternatively, firms may increase their demand for workers in the younger age 
category who are not covered by the legislation, leading to increases in the wages of this 
group.   The robustness of our results to possible violations of these assumptions are 
investigated later in the paper.  
4. Data 
Our data comes from the ninth Youth Cohort Study for England and Wales (YC9).  The 
Youth Cohort Study is a longitudinal study of young people between the ages of 16 and 20 
years focusing on their education, training and employment. The sample is selected from 
pupils attending eligible schools in the maintained and independent sectors (excluding special 
schools) by taking those who were born on the 5th, 15th and 25th of each month.  In the case of 
YC9, this provided a total sample of 22,498, of which 21,105 were in England. The first 
sweep of data was collected by postal questionnaire and telephone interview between March 
and May 1998.  The number of legible responses received by the cut-off date in early June 
1998 was 14,662, a response rate of 65.6%. The second sweep of YC9 data was collected a 
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little over a year later, between April and July 1999,  with questionnaires sent out to all those 
who had responded in sweep 1. In this case, a total of 9,662 legible responses were obtained 
by the cut-off date in late July. It is this sample of 9,662 individuals who provided data at 
both sweeps that is used in the analysis that follows.  
 The Youth Cohort Study provides detailed information on the young person’s current 
activities – schooling, training and work - together with a monthly calendar of their main 
activity in each of the preceding twelve months.   At the first sweep, data on a wide range of 
background characteristics also is collected; this includes previous schooling and 
qualifications gained, ethnicity, parent’s education and occupation. The individual-level data 
from YC9 is supplemented by data relating to the local labour market including measures of 
earnings, employment composition and unemployment2. 
The YC9 sample is designed to be representative of the population who reached the 
minimum school-leaving age in 1996/97.  However, there is ample evidence of differential 
response rates by gender and by school attainment level. To avoid potential biases from this 
source, sample weights are used designed to match the responding sample at sweep 2 to the 
population of England and Wales with respect to number of known characteristics including 
gender, region, school type, GCSE attainment levels3.  
Eligibility for the national minimum wage is determined from the information 
provided on the individual’s month and year of birth, and on the month that the sweep 2 
survey is returned.  In the absence of information on the actual date of birth and of survey 
return, the estimate of the individual’s age is correct only to within ±1 month.  Given this 
measurement error, all those whose estimated age at the date of the sweep 2 return is 217 
                                                 
2
 The YCS contains information on the local education authority of the individual. LEAs are matched to local 
authority level data on labour market variables available through the National Online Manpower Information 
Service (NOMIS). 
3
  For details of the construction of the sampling weights see Finch et al (2004) 
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months or more are 18 years of age and eligible to receive the national minimum wage 
[ 12 =iNMW ].  Those with an estimated aged of 215 months or less are only 17 years-old and 
therefore not covered by the legislation [ 02 =iNMW ].  The group with an estimated age of 
216 months includes both eligible and ineligible individuals. One way to handle this group is 
simply to exclude them from the estimation sample altogether, and this is the approach 
adopted in much of the analysis that follows.  An alternative is to assign them an average 
‘treatment’ value on the assumption that their true age is uniformly distributed across the 
interval 215 to 217 months, in which case 502 .=iNMW  for those with an estimated age of 
216 months. We present some results based on this approach as a further check on the 
robustness of our findings. 
Before proceeding with the analysis, we take a look at some descriptive statistics for 
the treatment and control groups in order to identify any possible systematic differences in 
relevant characteristics. Aside from age, the only sample characteristic of those listed in 
Table 1 that differs significantly across the two groups is gender, with a four percentage point 
difference in the proportion of females in the treatment group and in the control group.  This 
is a reflection of the tendency of girls to complete and return the survey more promptly than 
boys, with the result that they are younger on average at the date of survey return. Controlling 
for the month of survey return, the difference in the gender composition of the two groups is 
small, around 1 percentage point. 
5.  The impact of the introduction of a national minimum wage on the wages of young 
workers 
A premise of our empirical analysis is that the introduction of the national minimum wage 
significantly increased the wages of those workers covered by the legislation relative to their 
younger counterparts.  The Low Pay Commission in their second report concluded that the 
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introduction of the development rate had had a substantial impact on the pay of young 
workers, affecting “the earnings of a larger proportion of 18-21 year olds than those aged 22 
and above who have benefited from the full minimum wage”.(Low Pay Commission (2000), 
p 79).  However, this does not rule out the possibility that those below the age of 18 years 
also benefited significantly from the legislation. 
Some information on the earnings of young people before and after the introduction 
of the national minimum is available from the YC9. For those employed in a full-time or 
part-time job or on a government-supported training programme at the time of the survey, 
information is collected on their usual take-home pay, after deductions but including 
overtime and bonuses, on a weekly or a monthly basis as appropriate, and their usual weekly 
hours of work.4  Clearly there are a number of drawbacks to this data for current purposes.  
The data relates to take-home pay rather than gross wages.  An estimate of hourly pay is 
computed by converting reported earnings to a weekly basis and then dividing by reported 
weekly hours of work.  This introduces two possible sources of measurement error which 
combine multiplicatively and in order to reduce their possible effects, we exclude the 1 
percent tails of the sample distribution in both reported earnings and reported hours of work. 
 Summary statistics for the distribution of hourly earnings for those in the YC9 
sample who reported earnings from employment in both sweep 1 and sweep 2 are shown in 
Table 2.  These suggest that differences in the earnings distribution of the two groups were 
small in sweep 1, but by sweep 2, there is a significant differential in favour of the older age 
group, particularly in the lower half of the earnings distribution. These findings can be seen 
more clearly in the kernel density estimates of (ln) hourly earnings depicted in Figure 1.  
Here we can see a significant shift to the right in the distribution of earnings for the older age 
                                                 
4
 Those with more than one current job are asked to provide this information for the job with the most hours of 
work For further details see Finch et al (2004) 
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group relative to their younger counterparts between sweep 1 and sweep 2.  The shift is even 
more pronounced if we exclude from the sample those enrolled on government-supported 
training schemes, some of whom would have been exempt from the national minimum wage 
under the terms of the legislation (see Figure A1 of the Appendix). 
While there is a clear evidence of an earnings differential in favour of the older age 
group opening up between sweep 1 and sweep 2 of YC9, it does not follow that this is a 
direct result of the introduction of the national minimum wage.  As already observed, it could 
be that young workers tend to transfer to higher adult rates of pay when they reach the age of 
18 years.  If this is the case then the key identifying assumption of the analysis – namely that 
the NMW legislation is the only source of a discontinuity in the relationship between the 
individual’s age and their behaviour – would not hold. 
One way to investigate this further would be to undertake a comparable analysis of 
the earnings distribution of the two groups –  those aged 18 years at sweep 2 and those still 
aged 17 years at sweep 2 – for an earlier school-year cohort, pre-dating the introduction of 
the national minimum wage.  Unfortunately this is less straightforward than it sounds.  For 
the two preceding Youth Cohort Studies, the successive sweeps were carried out at two-
yearly intervals rather than annually, and so the second sweeps took place when the 
participants were aged 18/19 years rather than aged 17/18 years.  We have to go back to 
Youth Cohort Study 6, the first sweep of which was conducted in the spring of 1992, to 
obtain panel data with the same age structure as YC9.  However there are substantial 
differences in the design of the questionnaire for this earlier study and that for YC9. 
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Moreover, there are major changes in further education and training provision over the period 
1992 to 1998 which limits further the comparability of the two surveys.5 
With these limitations in mind, the kernel density estimates of (ln) hourly earnings for 
those who reported earnings from employment in both sweep 1 and 2 of YC6 are shown in  
Figure A2 of the Appendix. The kernel density estimates look very different from those for 
YCS9.  They display strong bi-modality and there is evidence of significant earnings 
differential in favour of the older age group in both sweeps. That said, we see little evidence 
that this differential increased substantially between sweep 1 and sweep 2, particularly in the 
lower half of the distribution. 
6. National minimum wage and enrolment in full-time education 
The focus of our empirical analysis is the effects of eligibility for the national minimum wage 
on enrolment in full-time post-compulsory schooling6.  The raw data on enrolment rates at 
sweep 1 and sweep 2 by eligibility for the national minimum wage are reported in Table 3.  
These raw differences suggest a small negative impact on participation in full-time education 
with the enrolment rate for the treated group falling by 11.88 percentage points between 
sweeps 1 and 2, compared with a decline of just 10.73 percentage points for the younger 
control group.  However, these differences evaporate if we control for the timing of the return 
of the sweep 2 survey.  In local education authorities in England and Wales, the school year 
formally ends in the third week of July.  For some of those who returned the sweep 2 survey 
in July 1999, their school year had effectively ended, and as a consequence, they are less 
likely to report participation in full-time education as their main activity.  At the same time, 
those returning the sweep 2 survey late are more likely to have reached the age of 18 years by 
                                                 
5
 The introduction of  General National Vocational qualifications (GNVQ) based on two years of full-time study  
were introduced nationally in 1993. The Modern Apprenticeship scheme was established in 1995, replacing 
previous government subsidized training provision such as theYouth Training Scheme. 
6
 Enrolled and attending as a full-time student in a school or college of further education in the state-maintained 
or independent sector. 
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the date of the survey return.  To eliminate this source of spurious correlation between 
eligibility for the national minimum wage and enrolment in full-time education, we include 
dummy variables for the month in which the survey is returned at each sweep, as well as a 
dummy variable for the sweep itself, when estimating the conditional logit model (2). 
Of the sample of 8,823 young persons, 1,214 changed school enrolment status 
between sweep 1 and sweep 2 of the survey and these provide the estimation sample for the 
conditional logit model (2).  The estimated coefficients of the logit model, together with their 
standard errors clustered at the local area level, are reported in Table 47.  Column 1 of table 4 
shows the results for the most basic specification of the logit model, with unobserved time-
invariant individual-specific effects, a dummy variable for the survey sweep, dummy 
variables for the month of survey return, and the treatment variable, 
ij
NMW .  In this case, the 
estimated effect of the national minimum wage on the probability of enrolling in full-time 
schooling is small, positive and statistically insignificant. The results are largely unchanged 
when we include additional controls for conditions in the local area labour market including 
measures of youth unemployment and the sectoral composition of local employment. 
Up until this point, the response of young people to eligibility for the national 
minimum wage is assumed to be homogenous. However, the ‘bite’ of the national minimum 
wage – the extent to which it affected the distribution of earnings in a local area – varies 
considerably across the UK as shown in Stewart (2002).  At its introduction in April 1999, 
the national minimum wage was set at £3.60 per hour (£3 per hour for workers aged 18 to 
21years). As a proportion of hourly earnings at the lowest quintile of the distribution in each 
of the 171 local authority areas of England and Wales, the minimum wage varied between 86 
percent and 37 percent (44 percent if the City of London is excluded). Given this 
                                                 
7
 Estimated by pseudo-maximum likelihood using the clogit procedures with sampling weights in Stata 10. 
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considerable spatial variation, we would expect that the effect of the minimum wage on 
young people’s behaviour to vary spatially also.   
To capture potential spatial variation in the treatment effect, we interact eligibility for 
the national minimum wage with the local ‘bite’ of the national minimum as measured by the 
ratio of the value of the national minimum wage to the value of hourly earnings at the lowest 
quintile of the distribution for full-time workers in the local area in 19988.  The results are 
reported in the third column of table 4. Allowing for this form of heterogeneity, we find that 
eligibility for the national minimum wage has a well-determined, statistically significant 
effect on the probability of enrolment in schooling. The effect is negative for young people 
residing in areas where the local ‘bite’ of the minimum wage is large, and it increases as the 
local ‘bite’ declines, becoming positive for those living in areas where hourly earnings are 
relatively high. 
The possibility that eligibility for the national minimum wage is confounded with 
other factors related to the individual’s relative age within the school-year cohort remains a 
concern. The analysis to date captures the potential effects of the individual’s relative age 
through a time-invariant individual-specific effect. However, it is possible that relative age 
effects are not time-invariant but rather cause the probability of enrolment in schooling to 
evolve differently over time. For example, individuals who are more mature may be less 
likely to drop-out of schooling. To allow for this, we include a low-order polynomial of the 
individual’s relative age interacted with the sweep 2 dummy variable in the logit model. 
Column 4 of table 4, reports the results obtained with a quadratic function of relative age, 
while column 5 shows the results for a linear spline function with a knot at the equivalent of 
                                                 
8
 For England and Wales as a whole, the 10th percentile of the hourly earnings distribution in Spring 1998 was 
£4.60 and the 20th percentile was £5.53, compared with a national minimum wage of £3.60.  The 20th percentile 
is used in preference to the 10th percentile at the local area level because the sample estimates are more reliable 
and there are no missing values. 
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age 18 years at sweep 2.  The estimates of the effects of eligibility for the national minimum 
wage are largely unaffected by the inclusion of these additional terms in the relative age of 
the individual. 
As a final exercise, we consider the possibility that other time-invariant characteristics 
may cause the probability of enrolment in schooling to evolve differently over the two 
sweeps of the survey. Young persons with higher levels of prior academic attainment or with 
more highly-educated parents may be more likely to remain enrolled in post-compulsory 
schooling.   To control for these potential effects, we include a number of individual 
characteristics interacted with the sweep 2 dummy variable.  The characteristics considered 
are: the individual’s age relative to the cohort average; gender; ethnicity; parent’s education; 
and the number of higher grade (grades A* to C) GCSEs achieved by the completion of 
compulsory schooling.   As can be seen in columns 6 and 7 of table 4, our results with respect 
to the treatment effects of eligibility for the national minimum are robust to the inclusion of 
these additional controls.  In this case, the absolute magnitudes of the coefficients increase 
somewhat and the corresponding standard errors tend to increase also, but estimated 
coefficients for the treatment effect remain statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
Figure 3 shows the estimated logit coefficients, LQ
a
LQ
a
EWE ,min /.
ˆˆ)(ˆ 21 θθθ += , for 
different values of lowest quintile earnings LQ
a
E , using the parameter estimates reported in 
column 6 of table 4.  Also depicted are the 90 and 95 percent confidence interval bands for 
the estimates.  Eligibility for the national minimum wage reduces the probability of 
enrolment in schooling in local authority areas with lowest quintile earnings of less than 
£5.60 per hour. However, the confidence intervals of the estimates are relatively wide, and 
the effects are significantly negative at the 10 percent level only for areas where lowest 
quintile earnings are below £4.10 per hour. Of the 171 local authority areas in England and 
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Wales,  106 had lowest quintile earnings of less that £5.60 in 1998, prior to the introduction 
of the national minimum, only two had lowest quintile earnings of less than £4.10. 
As an alternative to interacting eligibility for the national minimum wage with a 
continuous measure of the minimum wage’s ‘bite’ into the local area’s earnings distribution 
as in table 4, we could allow the effects to vary with local area earnings according to a step 
function.  Table A4 of the appendix shows a set of results using this type of specification and 
the pattern of treatment effects is consistent with that depicted in figure 3. For young people 
residing in local authorities in the lower tail of the distribution with respect to lowest quintile 
hourly earnings, eligibility for the NMW has a significant negative effect on enrolment in 
full-time education.  For those residing in local authorities in the middle range of the 
distribution, eligibility for the NMW has no discernible effect; while for those residing in 
local authorities in the upper tail of the distribution, the estimated effects are generally 
positive, but small and not statistically significant.  
As already noted, it is not possible in a conditional logit framework to calculate the 
average effect of the treatment on the probability of enrolling in full-time schooling across 
the distribution of time-invariant individual-specific effects in the population. However, we 
can assess the effect of the treatment on the probability of an individual quitting full-time 
schooling between sweeps 1 and 2 (conditional on a change in enrolment status) since this 
does not depend on the unobserved individual-specific effects (see equation (2)).  In the 
upper part of figure 4, we show the estimated effect of the national minimum wage on the 
probability of quitting full-time schooling for a representative 18 year old.9  (The broken lines 
                                                 
9
 Representative individual is a 18 year-old white male with 5 GCSE qualifications grades A* to C; mother 
educated to the level of A-levels or equivalent; resident in the East Midlands region; no change in local labour 
market conditions between sweeps. 
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depict the corresponding 90 percent confidence bands for the estimate.10)  In this particular 
example, eligibility for the national minimum wage, more than doubles the probability of 
dropping out of schooling in the case of 18 years-olds living in local areas where the  lowest 
quintile earnings are below £4.40.  For this exercise, we assume that there is no change in 
local labour market conditions between the two sweeps in order to highlight the relationship 
between the magnitude of the treatment effect - as measured by the difference in the two 
probabilities – and hourly earnings in the local area. Using the actual sample data, as in the 
lower part of figure 4, produces ‘noise’ about the underlying negative relationship between 
the magnitude of the average treatment effect and the level of earnings in the local area. 
7.  Robustness  
Before concluding, we review the results of a number of estimation exercises undertaken to 
investigate the robustness of our finding.  The first of these involves narrowing the age range 
of young people included in our estimation sample. The full sample is unbalanced in the 
sense that it includes individuals within -3 months and +9 months of their 18th birthday at 
sweep 2.  Columns 2 to 4 of table 6 show the results obtained if the age interval around the 
18th birthday is narrowed to provide a more balanced sample. For ease of comparison, 
column 1 of table 6 reports the results obtained with the full sample (i.e as in column 5 of 
table 4).  As one would expect, the smaller samples result in larger standard errors, but 
generally speaking, our findings are robust to narrowing the age interval around the 18th 
birthday. 
The second exercise is to re-estimate the model including the observations on those 
whose estimated age at the time the sweep 2 survey return is equal to 216 months.  Up until 
this point, this group has been excluded from the analysis on the grounds that we are unable 
                                                 
10
 The confidence limits are computed using the ‘delta’ method and consequently the values are not restricted to 
lie in the interval [0,1]. 
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to distinguish a priori between those members who are covered by the legislation and those 
who are not. An alternative approach is to include them in the estimation sample with 
i
NMW set equal to 0.5, the average treatment for members of this group on the assumption 
that birth dates and survey return dates are uniformly distributed across the month. The 
results of this exercise for the quadratic specification are reported in column 5 of table 6 and 
are very similar to those for the sample with the 216 months age group excluded.  
The question remains whether our results are being driven by the effects on enrolment 
in schooling of attaining the age of 18 years per se, rather than a consequence of becoming 
eligible to receive the national minimum wage.  To investigate this further, we re-estimate the 
model as specified in table 4, but with the dependent variable defined in terms of the 
individual’s enrolment status in the previous November, rather than at the time the survey 
was completed.  To be precise, the dependent variable is now N
ij
S =1 if i is enrolled in full-
time education in the November prior to sweep j, and N
ij
S =0 otherwise. Recall that the 
national minimum wage legislation did not come into effect until 1st April 1999, and hence 
the minimum wage was not in place in either November 1997 or November 1998. We 
construct a new treatment variable 
i
Nov18  based on the individual’s age in the November 
prior to sweep 2 of the survey (i.e. November 1998).  For those whose estimated age at 
November 1998 is 217 months or more, 118 =
i
Nov ; for those aged 215 months or less at 
November 1998, 018 =
i
Nov . If our results are being driven by factors related to being 18 
years-old, rather than a consequence of eligibility for the national minimum wage, then we 
should expect to find a similar pattern of treatment effects in the new specification.  A can be 
seen in table 7, this is evidently not the case. The estimated coefficients associated with the 
treatment effect in this case are much smaller in magnitude and very poorly determined. 
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8. Concluding remarks 
This paper uses the introduction of a national minimum wage in the UK in April 1999 as a 
‘quasi experiment’ to assess the impact of statutory minimum wages on participation in 
further education by young people.  This empirical analysis has a number of distinct 
advantages over many previous studies of the effects of minimum wages. First, we are able to 
exploit the fact that assignment to the treatment is determined by being either side of a fixed 
age threshold.  Second, our panel data allows us to control for unobserved time-invariant 
heterogeneity using a difference-in-differences type estimator. 
Across the cohort as a whole, the average effect of the national minimum wage on 
enrolment in post-compulsory schooling appears to be negligible. However, for young people 
living in areas where earnings are relatively low, eligibility for the national minimum wage is 
associated with a significant reduction in the probability of enrolling in full-time schooling.  
It may seem surprising that a relatively modest increase in their average expected earnings 
from employment should have a significant impact on a young person’s decision to invest in 
human capital. However in low-paid local labour markets areas, the introduction of the 
national minimum wage significantly compressed differentials between unskilled and skilled 
workers, reducing the expected returns on human capital investment. This, as much as any 
short-term increase in the income, lies behind the observed reduction in enrolment rates in 
further education. 
Finally, our findings identify a short-term negative effect on enrolment in post-
compulsory schooling from minimum wages.  The analysis in this paper is unable to assess 
the long-term consequences of minimum wages for this cohort of young people. It may be - 
as Neumark and Waschter argue – that lower rates of school enrolment and reduced skill 
acquisition have long-lasting consequences for the affected individuals. It may be that over 
the longer term, minimum wages lead firms to upgrade the general skills of its workers and 
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the quality of the jobs that they offer as suggested by Acemoglu and Pischke (2003).  The 
robust identification of the effects of statutory minimum wages on labour market outcomes 
over the longer term remains the challenge for future empirical work. 
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Table 1: Sample characteristics 
 Group 1: Eligible for 
NMW 
Group 2: Not eligible 
for NMW 
 Age ≥ 217 months at 
sweep 2 
Age ≤ 215 months at 
sweep 2 
Sample size 6988 1857 
 
  
Average age at sweep 2 (months) 220.88 
(2.64) 
214.31 
(0.74) 
Gender (% female) 48.94 52.86 
Ethnicity (% white) 87.98 88.79 
Parent’s education (% at least one parent 
has a degree level qualification 
 
21.66 
 
22.77 
Type of school attended (% private) 7.39 6.62 
Average number of GCSEs grade A-C at 
completion of compulsory schooling 
4.53 
(3.85) 
4.18 
(3.91) 
Local area: average unemployment rate, 
Spring 1998 
3.74 
(1.71) 
3.62 
(1.65) 
Local area: average hourly earnings of 
full-time workers, Spring 1998 
8.06 
(1.01) 
8.02 
(1.02) 
* Summary statistics based on weighted data  
 
 
Table 2: The Introduction of the NMW and the  Earnings of Young Workers 
 
 Group 1: Eligible for NMW Group 2: Not eligible for 
NMW 
Sweep 1: 
April-June 
1998 
Sweep 2: 
May-July 
1999 
Sweep 1: 
April-June 
1998 
Sweep 2: 
May-July 
1999 
Number reporting hourly 
take-home pay in sweeps 1 
& 2 
 
 
2647 
 
 
2647 
 
 
672 
 
 
672 
 
    
Lowest decile 1.33 2.42 1.35 2 
Lower quartile 2.10 3 2 2.73 
Median 2.78 3.6 2.78 3.25 
Upper quartile 3.33 4.17 3.4 4 
Highest decile 4 5 4.1 5 
* Summary statistics based on weighted data 
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Table 3 : The Introduction of the NMW and Enrolment in Full-time Education 
 Group 1: 
Eligible for 
NMW 
Group 2: Not 
eligible for NMW 
 Age ≥ 217 mths 
at sweep 2 
Age ≤ 215 months 
at sweep 2 
Sample size 6970 1853 
Sweep 2- enrolment in full time education (%) 57.53 61.03 
Sweep 1- enrolment in full time education (%) 69.41 71.76 
 
-11.88 -10.73 
 
  
May 1999 returns - sample size 2369 1002 
Sweep 2- enrolment in full time education (%) 67.54 66.19 
Sweep 1- enrolment in full time education (%) 74.76 73.70 
 
-7.22 -7.51 
 
  
June 1999 returns - sample size 2790 656 
Sweep 2- enrolment in full time education (%) 56.68 57.16 
Sweep 1- enrolment in full time education (%) 67.67 68.56 
 
-10.99 -11.40 
 
  
July 1999 returns - sample size 1811 195 
Sweep 2- enrolment in full time education (%) 47.53 51.35 
Sweep 1- enrolment in full time education (%) 69.39 73.87 
 
-21.86 -22.52 
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 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 NMWi   
0.2615 
(0.2698) 
0.2742 
(0.2647) 
2.9763** 
(1.4573) 
2.9284** 
(1.3166) 
2.9763** 
(1.4573) 
3.3858** 
(1.4641) 
3.2164** 
(1.6060) 
][ LQ 1-ta,min /EW  * NMWi     -4.2298** (1.7881) 
-4.2106** 
(1.7584) 
-4.2298** 
(1.7881) 
-5.2320** 
(2.0497) 
-5.3023** 
(2.0356) 
][ LQ 1-ta,min /EW
 
  
-1.8794 
(4.1391) 
-2.0915 
(4.1504) 
-1.8794 
(4.1391) 
-7.0056 
(4.9933) 
-6.7010 
(5.0171) 
 Sweep  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Month of survey return  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Individual fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Local labour market conditions 
 (time-varying)  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Birth date *sweep    quadratic linear spline quadratic linear spline 
 Time invariant controls*sweep      Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-squared 0.4495 0.4564 0.4615 0.4651 0.4646 0.4960 0.4961 
Log pseudo-likelihood -531.91 -522.13 -517.19 -513.69 -514.22 -484.10 -483.94 
Notes:  There are 1220 observations at each sweep. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, clustered at the local authority area level throughout.  
** denotes significance of coefficient at the 5% level and * denotes significance at the 10% level.  
Labour market conditions: number of unemployed aged less than 18 years in local authority area; proportion of local authority employment in the service 
sector and in public administration.  
Time invariant controls: gender; ethnicity; parent’s education; number of GCSE qualification grades A-C gained by end of compulsory schooling; region of 
residence. 
LQ
ja
EW 1−,min / is the ratio of the value of the national minimum wage to the lowest quintile of  the distribution of hourly earnings for full-time workers in the 
local authority in year prior to sweep.  
 
Table 4:  The Effects of Eligibility for NMW on Enrolment in Full-time Education 
Dependent variable: Individual currently enrolled in full-time education (
ij
S )  
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Table 5:  The Effects of Eligibility for NMW on Enrolment in Full-time Education: Robustness checks 
Dependent variable: Individual currently enrolled in full-time education (
ij
S )  
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 Full sample     
3/+9 mths -3/+5 mths -3/+4 mths -3/+3 mths 
Including those 
aged 216 mths  
 NMWi   
3.3858** 
(1.4641) 
2.9516* 
(1.8378) 
2.6814 
(1.8904) 
3.6449* 
(2.2666) 
3.4539** 
(1.5091) 
NMWi  * LQjaEW 1−,min /   
-5.2320** 
(2.0497) 
-4.7617** 
(2.3630) 
-4.7592* 
(2.6562) 
-6.4547** 
(3.3005) 
-5.3586** 
(2.1001) 
LQ
ja
EW 1−,min /  
       -7.0056 
(4.9933) 
-5.5680 
(6.1751) 
-5.5149 
(6.7013) 
-7.4548 
(6.9085) 
-7.3167 
(4.8836) 
Sweep  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month of survey return (dv) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Local labour market conditions 
 (time-varying) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Birth date *sweep quadratic quadratic quadratic quadratic quadratic 
Time-invariant controls*sweep Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations in each sweep 1220 780 663 558 1318 
Pseudo R-squared 0.4960 0.4789 0.4757 0.5040 0.5091 
Notes:  see notes to table 4 
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Table 6:  The Effects of Eligibility for NMW on Enrolment in Full-time Education – Falsification Check 
Dependent variable: Individual enrolled in full-time education in November prior to survey ( N
ij
S )  
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Nov18i   
-0.3300 
(0.2904) 
-0.3514 
(0.2958) 
0.5805 
(2.1861) 
0.4449 
(2.3513) 
0.5925 
(2.1402) 
0.7687 
(2.6958) 
0.5093 
(2.4787) 
][ LQ 1-ta,min /EW  * Nov18i     -1.4442 (3.3837) 
-1.4060 
93.3569) 
-1.4676 
(3.3434) 
-1.4580 
(3.9330) 
-1.4820 
(3.9225) 
][ LQ 1-ta,min /EW
 
  
1.4723 
(5.3461) 
1.7638 
(5.3578) 
1.4305 
(5.3578) 
1.2637 
(5.8418) 
1.2187 
(5.8779) 
 Sweep  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Month of survey return  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Individual fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Local labour market conditions 
 (time-varying)  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Birth date *sweep    quadratic linear spline quadratic linear spline 
 Time invariant controls*sweep      Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-squared 0.4878 0.4945 0.4946 0.4953 0.4946 0.5232 0.5231 
Log pseudo-likelihood -448.19 -441.35 -441.25 -440.67 -441.21 -416.29 -416.36 
 
Notes:  There are 883 observations at each sweep. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, clustered at the local authority area level throughout.  
** denotes significance of coefficient at the 5% level and * denotes significance at the 10% level.  
Time-varying controls: number of unemployed aged less than 18 years in local authority area; proportion of local authority employment in the service sector 
and in public administration. Time invariant controls: gender; ethnicity; parent’s education; number of GCSE qualification grades A-C gained by end of 
compulsory schooling; region of residence. 
LQ
ja
EW 1−,min / is the ratio of the value of the national minimum wage to the lowest quintile of  the distribution of hourly earnings for full-time workers in the 
local authority in year prior to sweep j 
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Figure 1: Impact of the Introduction of the NMW on Earnings of Young 
Workers – Kernel Density Estimates of (Ln) Hourly Earnings 
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Figure 2: Marginal Effect of Eligibility for the National Minimum Wage (logit 
coefficients). 
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Figure 3: Impact of Eligibility for the National Minimum Wage. 
Estimated effect on the probability of quitting full-time schooling for those aged 18 
years.
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Appendix 
Table A1: Age Composition of YC9 sample 
Estimated age at 
sweep 2 in months 
Number in sample Estimated age at 
sweep 2 in months 
Number in sample 
213 344 220 786 
214 662 221 747 
215 851 222 736 
216 817 223 789 
217 815 224 742 
218 843 225 539 
219 775 226 196 
 
 
 
Table A2: Impact of the Introduction of the NMW on Earnings of Young 
Workers ( excluding those on government supported training schemes) 
 
 Group 1: Eligible for NMW Group 2: Not eligible for 
NMW 
Sweep 1: 
April-June 
1998 
Sweep 2: 
May-July 
1999 
Sweep 1: 
April-June 
1998 
Sweep 2: 
May-July 
1999 
Number reporting hourly 
take-home pay in sweeps 1 
& 2 
 
 
2337 
 
 
2337 
 
 
586 
 
 
586 
 
    
Lowest decile 2 2.75 1.96 2.42 
Lower quartile 2.5 3.17 2.5 2.95 
Median 3 3.75 3 3.33 
Upper quartile 3.5 4.33 3.59 4 
Highest decile 4.14 5 4.28 5 
* Summary statistics based on weighted data 
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Table A3: Earnings Distribution of Young Workers, Youth Cohort 6  (216) 
 
 Group 1: Aged 18 years at 
sweep 2 
Group 2: Aged 17 years at 
sweep 2 
Sweep 1: 
April- June 
1992 
Sweep 2: 
April-June 
1993 
Sweep 1: 
April- June 
1992 
Sweep 2: 
April-June 
1993 
Number reporting hourly 
take-home pay in sweeps 1 
& 2 
 
 
2161 
 
 
2161 
 
 
1266 
 
 
1266 
 
    
Lowest decile 0.88 0.96 0.78 0.90 
Lower quartile 1.13 1.5 0.99 1.28 
Median 1.97 2.41 1.75 2.13 
Upper quartile 2.5 3 2.25 2.7 
Highest  2.96 3.51 2.77 3.18 
* Summary statistics based on weighted data 
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Figure A1: Impact of the Introduction of the NMW on Earnings of Young 
Workers (excluding those on Government Supported Training schemes) – Kernel 
Density Estimates of (Ln) Hourly Earnings  
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Figure A2: Kernel Density Estimates of (Ln) Hourly Earnings for YC6 (216) 
0
.
5
1
1.
5
-.5 0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5
Aged 16 years Aged 17 years
England and Wales, sweep 1
0
.
5
1
1.
5
-.5 0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5
Aged 17 years Aged 18 years
England and Wales, sweep 2
 
39 
 
Table A4:  The Effects of Eligibility for NMW on Enrolment in Full-time Education – Step Functions 
The intervals of the step function are defined such that λ percent of school-year cohort reside in local authorities with lowest quintile earnings of less than ;L
a
E   and 
of greater than U
a
E  
Dependent variable: Individual currently enrolled in full-time education (
ij
S )  
 
 5=λ  10=λ  15=λ  20=λ  25=λ  
546764 .;. == U
a
L
a
EE  256874 .;. == U
a
L
a
EE  096964 .;. == U
a
L
a
EE  825035 .;. == UaLa EE  725105 .;. == UaLa EE  
 NMWi   ( LaLQa EE ≤98, ) -1.1316* (0.6398) 
-0.9323 
(0.6441) 
-1.0677* 
(0.6120) 
-0.4199 
(0.5906) 
-0.4005 
(0.5580) 
NMWi   ( UaLQaLa EEE ≤< 98, ) 0.0191 (0.5883) 
0.0091 
(0.5895) 
-0.0475 
(0.6024) 
-0.0284 
(0.5689) 
0.0937 
(0.5606) 
NMWi   ( UaLQa EE >98, )  0.0316 (0.6770) 
0.2698 
(0.6760) 
0.5296 
(0.6528) 
0.3713 
(0.7010) 
0.1176 
(0.6937) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.4934 0.4952 0.4984 0.4939 0.4936 
Log pseudo-likelihood -486.51 -484.79 -481.78 -486.02 -486.31 
 NMWi   ( LaLQa EE ≤98, ) -1.1504** (0.4143) 
-0.9410** 
(0.4692) 
-1.0222** 
(0.3886) 
-0.3937 
(0.3502) 
-0.4881 
(0.3127) 
NMWi   ( UaLQaLa EEE ≤< 98, ) - - - - - 
NMWi   ( UaLQa EE >98, )  0.0493 (0.4732) 
0.2618 
(0.4954) 
0.5730 
(0.4671) 
0.3973 
(0.4336) 
0.0322 
(0.4181) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.4934 0.4952 0.4984 0.4939 0.4936 
Log pseudo-likelihood -486.51 -484.79 -481.79 -486.02 -486.33 
Notes:  There are 1220 observations at each sweep. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, clustered at the local authority area level throughout.  
** denotes significance of coefficient at the 5% level and * denotes significance at the 10% level.  Additional controls: as in column 5 of table 4. 
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